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RE-EXAMINATION OF SECTION 14c(3) AS A GROUND
FOR OBJECTION TO DISCHARGE
CARL D. FRIEBOLIN*
When at its annual Conference, the National Association of
Bankruptcy Referees,' without a dissent passes a resolution approv-
ing a proposal to eliminate from the Bankruptcy Act one particular
ground of objection to a discharge which has been in the Bankruptcy
Act for fifty years; when, since that time the referees of the country,
with only a very few exceptions, - have stated that such ground of
objection should either be eliminated or, at the very least, modified
in order to carry out the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act; and when
it is estimated that in the past year probably 80% to 90% of all ob-
jections to discharge filed in bankruptcy cases, were based upon
this ground3-it would seem that such provision of the Act should
receive immediate and thorough study and re-examination-not to
say an agonizing re-appraisal-with a view to elimination or
modification. The provision referred to is Section 14c(3) of the
Bankruptcy Act, enacted in 1903 and, with minor amendments, still
a part of that Act.
Section 14c of the Act prescribes the grounds of objection
which may be made by the trustee or a creditor to the discharge of a
bankrupt in strict bankruptcy. These grounds are also available for
objecting to confirmation of a debtor's Arrangement under Chap-
ter XI ;4 to confirmation of a Wage Earner Plan under Chapter
X111' and to the confirmation of a Real Property Arrangement
under Chapter XII,6 the latter for all practical purposes being a
*Referee in Bankruptcy, United States District Court, Northern District
of Ohio, Cleveland, Ohio; Judge of The Common Pleas Court, Cuyahoga
County, Ohio.
1. Conference of 1950. See 25 J. N. A.- Ref. Bankr. 43 (1951).
2. Result of a poll of referees by the writer. Out of the 86 districts of the
federal courts in the United States, referees from 45 districts served by 98
referees, expressed an opinion; this included all of the larger cities.
3. Estimates furnished by referees in districts polled; they keep no rec-
ords on the nature of objections. The Bankruptcy Division of the Administra-
tive Office of United States Courts does not maintain a record of the grounds
of objections to discharge that are filed in strict bankruptcy proceedings nor
of the grounds of objection filed to confirmation of a debtor's arrangement
(Ch. XI) or real property arrangement (Ch. XII) or a wage earner plan
(Ch. XIII). It will be noted that Official Form No. 45 (Discharge of Bank-
rupt) does not provide for stating the ground of objection. The Bankruptcy
Division has a record beginning in 1940 of the number of discharges granted,
discharges denied, and discharges waived or not applied for, in strict bank-
ruptcy proceedings only.
4. § 366(3) of the Bankruptcy Act. References hereinafter to the Act
will be to chapters or sections only.
5. § 656(a) (3).
6. § 472(3).
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"reorganization" by other than corporations. 7 In the interest of
brevity, these three debtor relief proceedings will hereinafter be
referred to collectively as Plans of Adjustment.
This ground of objection (Section 14c(3)), in substance is that
a bankrupt or debtor obtained either money or property on credit
or an extension or renewal of credit by making a materially false
statement in writing respecting his financial condition. The exact
language of this clause and the changes made in it after 1903, will
be found in the note below." As will be noted, the respective amend-
ments reflected or annulled the interpretations of the clause as made
prior thereto by the courts. From the beginning it has always pro-
vided as a ground of objection: the obtaining of credit upon a
materially false statement in writing. So today we have in Section
14c(3), substantially, the 1903 provision.
In any event, the courts since 1926 have quite uniformly held
that the present provision includes any kind of writing-not neces-
sarily a commercial report listing assets and liabilities-which in-
7. Section 14c is not applicable in Chapter X.
8. When originally, and for the first time in a Bankruptcy Act, em-
bodied in the Act in 1903, § 14c(3)-at that time and until 1938 known as
14b(3)-read as follows: "Sec. 14b. The judge shall hear the application for
a discharge .. . and investigate the merits of the application and discharge
the applicant, unless he has ... (3) obtained property on credit from any
person upon a materially false statement in writing made to such person for
the purpose of obtaining such property on credit."
In 1910 this clause of 14b was amended to read as follows: (omitted
words are in brackets; new words in italics) "(3) obtained money or property
on credit [from any person] upon a materially false statement in writing,
made by hint to [such] any person or his representative for the purpose of
obtaining [such property on) credit from such person."
The word "money" was added to remove any doubt that money is
property. See 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1361 n. 1 (14th ed. 1940). The words "or
his representative" were added for obvious reasons.
The 1910 amendment also p-.rmitted the trustee-as well as parties in
interest-to oppose a discharge if authorized by creditors.
In 1926 this clause was again amended, the language there adopted re-
maining unchanged in the Act today. But the Chandler Act (1938), 44 Stat.
663 (1938), 11 U. S. C. § 32c (1952), did change the section number from 14b
to 14c and also changed the opening sentence so that at present it reads:
(new language in italics, former language-except former first sentence
of § 14b-in brackets) "14c. The court shall grant the discharge unless
satisfied that the bankrupt has... (3) obtained money or property on credit,
or obtained an extension or renewal of credit, by making or publishing or
causing to be made or published in any manner whatsoever, [upon] a ma-
terially false statement in writing [made by him to any person or his repre-
sentative for the purpose of obtaining credit from such person] respecting
his financial condition."
In adding in 1926 the words "extension or renewal of credit" Congress
adopted the construction that courts had already given it. See 1 Collier,
Bankruptcy 1362 n. 4. The words "making or publishing in any manner" were
added to make certain that a creditor could rely on a financial statement made
by a bankrupt to a mercantile agency. See 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1377 n. 7.
All emphasis in this article, unless otherwise noted, is by the writer.
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cludes a statement referring to the writer's financial condition,
whether or not the bankrupt or debtor was at the time engaged in
business.0 In consequence, any individual who obtains a loan regard-
less of amount, or merely a renewal of the loan which originally had
been honestly contracted by making a written false statement re-
specting his financial condition at the time of renewal, may be denied
a discharge from all of his debts, or be denied confirmation of a Plan
of Adjustment even though every creditor other than the lender,
has duly accepted such Plan of Adjustment.
No sound and intelligent consideration of the purposes of Sec-
tion 14c(3) and its consequences in bankruptcy administration can
be had without taking into account the provisions of Section 17 of
the Act and its purpose and its effect and influence in such admin-
istration. The failure to differentiate between these two sections and
their respective purposes in bankruptcy has led to confusion.
While Section 14c enumerates the acts-the grounds-which, if
proven, will bar a discharge of a bankrupt or refusal of confirmation
of a Plan of Adjustment, Section 17 enumerates the kinds of liabili-
ties which, although a discharge is granted or a debtor's Plan of
Adjustment is confirmed, are excepted from the effect of the dis-
charge or of such confirmation. In other words, such excepted lia-
bilities will not be released or affected-they survive a discharge or
confirmation although all other debts will be discharged, or reduced
as provided in the Plan.
Section 17, in some form, has been in the present Bankruptcy
Act from the date of its enactment in 1898. The amendments thereof
in substance, have been in a change of the word "judgment" to "lia-
bilities" and the addition to the "excepted" status, of further kinds
of liabilities. The present language of the section will be found in the
note below with the several amendments indicated.' 0
9. See 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1358 n. 12; 7 Remington, Bankruptcy§ 3327.10 n. llel (5th ed. 1939) (1953 Supp.). See also note 38 infra.
10. § 17. "Debts Not Affected by a Discharge. A discharge in bank-
ruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, whether allow-
able in full or in part, (words in italic were inserted in 1938) except such as
(1) are due as a tax levied by the United States, or any State, county, dis-
trict, or municipality; (2) are liabilities for (italic words were, in 1903, sub-
stituted for "judgments in actions for fraud or") obtaining money or (these
two words added in 1938) property by false pretenses or false representations,
or for willful and malicious injuries to the person or property of another,
or for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife
or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female, (words italicized were
added by amendment in 1903), or for breach of promise of marriage accom-
panied by seduction, (words italicized were added by amendment in 1917),
or for criminal conversation (words italicized were added by amendment in
1903) ; (3) have not been duly scheduled in time for proof and allowance,
with the name of the creditor, if known to the bankrupt, unless such creditor
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In substance--as appears from the provisions of Section 17-
after providing that only provable debts may be discharged, it ex-
cepts from discharge, in additi'on to taxes of all kinds, debts which
are: liabilities for obtaining money or property by false representa-
tions or for willful and malicious injuries; for alimony due or
to become due; for the support of the family; for seduction; for
breach of promise; created by breach of the fiduciary relationship by
way of embezzlement, fraud, or misappropriation; for wages earned
within three months of bankruptcy; or not scheduled in bankruptcy.
It might be said that the excepted obligations imply, to a degree,
a moral obligation-at least they indicate a public policy - that
certain debts should not be affected by a discharge of the bankrupt.
And be it noted that these various kinds of liabilities are also not
affected by a confirmation of a debtor's Plan of Adjustment by way
of an Arrangement or Wage Earner Plan.
While it is true that the courts have frequently said that the
primary purpose of bankruptcy - strict bankruptcy and debtor re-
lief provisions-is the equitable distribution of the debtor's prop-
erty and a discharge to the "honest" bankrupt, we must never lose
sight of the fact that bankruptcy, including the Debtor Relief Pro-
visions, is a creature of statute, that discharges are not governed by
equitable considerations, but by the enactments of Congress regarded
by it as being in the best interest of the public.'
The grounds of objection to a discharge or to confirmation of
Plans of Adjustment are statutory: Section 14c of the Act. Also,
the liabilities excepted from a discharge are statutory: Section 17.
The test of granting a discharge as well as of exceptions from its
effect is not "honesty" of the debtor, as that elastic word might be
defined by any particular judge or creditor but whether a privilege
or right of the debtor or creditor as measured by the statutory pro-
visions in those sections of the Act, is to be granted or withheld.12
had notice or actual knowledge of the proceedings in bankruptcy; or (4)
were created by his fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation or defalcation
while acting as an officer or in any fiduciary capacity; or (5) are for wages
[due to workmen, clerks, traveling or city salesmen, or servants) which have
been earned within three months before the date of commencement of the
proceedings in bankruptcy due to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or
city salemnen, on salary or commission basis, whole or part time, whether
or not selling exclusively for the bankrupt; or (6) are due for moneys of an
employee received or retained by his employer to secure the faithful perform-
ance by such employee of the terms of a contract of employnent. (Clauses(5) and (6) were added by amendment in 1922 but were changed in form
as here appears in 1938.)
11. 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1274 n. 9.
12. Judge Hough of the second circuit in In re Hughes, 262 Fed. 500,
44 Am. B. R. 447 (2d Cir. 1919) stated: "It is a mistake, and a widespread
one, to regard a discharge in bankruptcy as a reward of virtue, or its denial
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While, perhaps, one might say that some of the excepted debts
in Section 17 imply, to some degree, a lack of honesty or of moral
obligation on the part of the debtor, others of such excepted debts
do not. Obtaining property by the debtor by fraudulent representa-
tions, and breach of the duty of a fiduciary surely do connote moral
laxity; debts for taxes or for wages earned within three months do
not.
Similarly, in Section 14c, all the acts which constitute the more
serious and fatal consequences of a denial of a discharge or of the
confirmation of a Plan of Adjustment are not, by any moral stand-
ard, the acts of a "dishonest" man. Failure to keep adequate books,
a prior discharge or confirmation of a compromise arrangement
within six years and inability satisfactorily to explain losses are
not necessarily the badges of a "dishonest" man. Actually, an "hon-
est" bankrupt may be denied a discharge or may remain liable for an
honestly incurred debt which is excepted from a discharge.
All of this is said to emphasize the fact that we are construing a
statute which declares a public policy, a policy of what is in the pub-
lic interest, a policy that certain specific acts, whether "honest" or
"dishonest," shall operate to deny a discharge or confirmation of a
debtor's Plan of Adjustment, and, that certain liabilities honestly
or dishonestly contracted shall be excepted from a discharge which
does release other creditors whose claims are not so specifically
excepted.
If it be said that under Section 17, the false pretenses or repre-
sentations need not be in writing as they must under Section
14c(3)-well, one is just as "dishonest" as the other.
ARGUMENT FOR ELIMINATION OF SECTION 14c (3)
A liability excepted from a discharge under Section 17 of the
Act should not be the basis of a ground of objection to a discharge
under Section 14c. These sections should, to such extent at least,
be mutually exclusive.
We have heretofore examined the provisions of these two sec-
tions and noted not only their respective purposes but also their
respective express provisions. Our contention is that to equate the
existence of a liability - any liability - of a bankrupt or debtor,
which is excepted from a discharge (or confirmation), with a
as a punishment for general moral turpitude. Discharge is a legal right at-
taching to the status of bankrupt, which right the statute requires the court
to recognize, unless it be affirmatively shown that the applicant has done one
or more of the acts enumerated specifically... (in § 14b of the Statute)." Id.
at 502, 44 Anm. B. R. at 449-450.
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ground of objection to the granting of a discharge, is illogical, is
not consistent with the purposes of the Bankruptcy Act and pre-
sents the opportunity- if not an invitation- of conduct tending
to pervert and abuse the processes of bankruptcy administration.
Moreover, is was not the intention of Congress to make every writ-
ten false financial statement by anybody a ground of objection. If
there had been such intention, the radical changes in our economy
have been such that this clause no longer accords with or achieves
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.
While it seems logical to conclude that the liabilities excepted
from a discharge or from confirmation of a Plan of Adjustment
were so excepted in anticipation of a discharge being granted to the
bankrupt, it hardly seems logical to believe that it was the intention
that a creditor holding a claim which would be excepted if a dis-
charge is granted, could also object to the granting of a discharge
which would result in the release of no debts at all. At least one of
the early authoritative commentators on the Bankruptcy Act per-
ceived the incongruity of the situation if not its unforseen conse-
quences.' 3
It would seem clear that an excepted creditor would not want to
object to a discharge nor want some other creditor to object to it
when to do so would defeat the former's privilege. If a discharge
is granted, the excepted creditor could collect from new assets of the
bankrupt or debtor while non-excepted creditors would be barred by
the discharge. If he (or anyone else) objected to a discharge and
the discharge were denied, he would lose his preferred status: all
creditors, excepted and non-excepted, would be in the same boat.
Although one court has said that an excepted creditor owed a
13. Remington, who spoke from the background of intimate study and
experience as a referee in bankruptcy beginning in 1898, in his 1908 edition
of Remington on Bankruptcy, with reference to making it a ground of objec-
tion under § 14b(3) that a creditor's debt was excepted under § 17 because
of false statement said:
"Sec. 2559 .... Whether any other person thus parting with the prop-
erty may oppose the discharge on this ground, is a question. The query
illustrates the lack of scientific basis for the addition of the ground of oppo-
sition by the amendment of 1903. [§ 14b(3)]. It is easy enough to see that the
particular creditor harmed by the false representations should have his claim
excepted from the operation of the discharge, but why other creditors should
be entitled to take advantage of a wrongdoing of the bankrupt that did not
harm them at all but rather benefited them by the pro tanto enrichment of
the bankrupt's estate, it is exceedingly difficult to understand. It would seem
that, logically, the grounds for refusing a bankrupt's discharge should be
limited to those acts which tend to deplete the estate and to make the dis-
covery of its true condition difficult; to those acts which affect the creditors
in general, and not merely particular creditors. For the particular creditor,
the remedy should be the excepting of his claim from the operation of the
discharge."
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moral duty to object to the discharge,1" it is not generally so re-
garded." It is clear, however, that any other creditor or the trustee
may object to the discharge by reason of the fraud upon the ex-
cepted creditor. It follows then, that under such circumstances, if
it developed, for example, during the examination of the bankrupt,
that he owed to one creditor a liability which was excepted, another
creditor - unexcepted -or the trustee, could object to a discharge
and, if successful, thereby defeat the purpose of Section 17, viz., to
save from release the excepted debt while, at the same time, to re-
lease the bankrupt or debtor from his other debts so that he, the
debtor, would be in a position to pay the preferred, the excepted
debt, e.g., his taxes, alimony or defaults as trustee.
The courts have frequently said that these two sections are not
mutually exclusive nor in pari nzateria; that they are distinct propo-
sitions; that Section 17 confers a personal right to a particular
creditor to be invoked only by him; that Section 14c is not for the
benefit of a particular creditor but for all creditors and the trustee
acting for all creditors. However, this theory results in absurdity
when a creditor other than an excepted creditor is permitted to ob-
ject to a discharge or confirmation of a Plan of Adjustment because
of the existence of one excepted debt, and thus deny the bankrupt
a discharge from any liability whatever. In the light of this un-
questionable fact, the words "not mutually exclusive and not even
pari materia" are mere semantic juggling. These two sections surely
do have some relevance to one another in considering the logic of
making the existence of a liability excepted from a discharge a
ground of objection to any discharge whatever.'6 Could this in-
congruous result be the intent of the Congress?
14. In re Walton, 51 F. Supp. 857, 54 Am. B. R. (N.S.) 748 (W.D.
Mo. 1943) (A creditor who claimed to be defrauded by a bankrupt's statement
brought suit on his claim after discharge had been granted though he had not
objected to the discharge. The court said that the creditor owed a duty to
inform the court of the fraud, that the jurisdiction of the court had been im-
posed upon, and that if there had been such a false statement it would be the
duty of the court to vacate the discharge to afford opportunity to others
to proceed.)
15. A defrauded creditor owes no duty to object to a discharge. See
In re Hadden, 142 F. 2d 896, 897 (6th Cir. 1944) ; In re Barber, 140 F. 2d
727, 729 (3d Cir. 1944) ; Watts v. Ellithorpe, 135 F. 2d 1, 3 (lst Cir. 1943) ;
see 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1273 n. 5a. This rule, in the instance of this par-
ticular ground of objection, explains the painful difficulty of effective enforce-
ment of this ground of objection. There is more logic in the opinion of the
judge in the Walton case if objections are not merely for the benefit of one
creditor but of all of them.
16. Perhaps it could be said that § 14c(3) is "tied in to a certain
extent" with § 17, as it was said that § 3a(1) "is tied in to a certain extent"
with §§ 67 and 70, although they, too, are distinct propositions. Capital
Finance Corp. v. Leveen, 217 F. 2d 36 (1st Cir. 1954).
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Of course the fact is that there is only one kind of liability ex-
cepted under Section 17 which is at the same time the basis of a
ground of objection under Section 14c. This is true because the
courts have quite generally held that under Section 14c(3) any
written false financial statement, no matter by whom it is given and
regardless of whether the debtor was engaged in business, is a
sufficient ground of objection to a discharge if credit is extended
thereon.
Perhaps it should be noted that although the language in Section
17(2) differs from that in Section 14c(3) in that in the former the
statement need not be in writing, there is otherwise no difference in
result. 7
Having the current construction by the courts in mind, what is
the situation? We have one particular kind of liability- only one
out of twelve excepted in Section 17- singled out to become, also,
the basis of a ground of objection to a discharge and to confirmation
of a debtor's Plan of Adjustment. Why should this particular lia-
bility be so singled out? Certainly not because it involves a higher
degree of moral turpitude than that of a debtor who can obtain a
discharge (although the debt is also excepted) if he is liable for
for malicious injuries, for alimony and support of family, for breach
of a trustee's duty - the highest known in the law - by embezzle-
ment or misappropriation of funds which may run into millions of
dollars.1 8 Nevertheless, as to these debts, a bankrupt so lacking in
integrity may obtain a discharge. But if he gets $14.00 in cash with
the renewal of a debt obtained upon a false statement, 14c(3) makes
it a ground of objection to his discharge which any creditor or the
trustee may prosecute. In a scale of ascending moral turpitude does
such conduct rank higher than the wrongdoing -even crimes of
violence - above enumerated? How does it accord with the recog-
nized liberal construction in favor of the bankrupt in the matter of
granting a discharge?
And we must remember that by the great weight of authority
this ground of objection is complete even though prior to bank-
ruptcy, the debtor in good faith had paid the creditor in full."" In
17. Personal Finance Co. v. Bruns, 16 N. J. Super 133, 84 A. 2d 32(App. Div. 1951). See also 1 Colier, Bankruptcy 1358 n. 12.
18. In the Act of 1841, § 4, misappropriation of trust funds was a ground
of objection.
19. In re Arky, 138 F. 2d 659 (2d Cir. 1943) (loan paid one year be-
fore bankruptcy) ; see 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1357 n. 10. Contra: In re Milhoff,
40 Am. B. R. 72 (N.D. Ohio 1917); see 7 Remington, Bankruptcy 3340;
Nadler, Bankruptcy § 755 (1948).
It is suggested that no action for deceit, for fraudulent representations,
is complete unless the plaintiff can show damages. If a borrower makes
[Vol. 39:673
RE-EXAMINATION OF SECTION 14c(3)
other words, a creditor is held to be "defrauded" although the debtor
in good faith pays him a debt strictly according to agreement if,
forsooth, he gave the creditor a written "false" statement. And
this is a ground for denying him a discharge from all of his other
debts - other debts, in view of the fact that the "defrauded credi-
tor" hIs been fully paid. And in a recent case in the court of appeals,
it was held that such ground of objection could be maintained by a
creditor who knew of the falsity of the statement and connived with
the bankrupt in procuring the loan from another creditor on the
false statement.20 It also should be remembered that since 1926
the burden is upon the bankrupt or debtor to establish his inno-
cence of the act constituting the ground of objection after the
objector has established a prima facie case. 21
Furthermore, the courts have generally held that it is immaterial
how long prior to the bankruptcy proceeding -not prior to ob-
taining the credit - the bankrupt or debtor made the false written
financial statement ;22 it might have been made even before a prior
bankruptcy or debtor relief proceeding.23
It has then come to this: A bankrupt or debtor who, several
years prior to his bankruptcy- strict bankruptcy or Plan of Ad-
justment -obtained cash in the sum of $14.00 upon a "false"
financial statement in writing incidental to the renewal of a note
for a larger sum which was originally honestly contracted and who,
inaccurate--call them "false"--statements in obtaining a loan, and pays
according to the terms of his contract, how can it be said that the creditor
has been defrauded? Prior to 1903 the exception in § 17 was "judgments" in
action for frauds. The substitution of the word "liabilities" was not intended
to except a liability for which a judgment could not be obtained, but to except
the liability where judgment had not been obtained at date of bankruptcy; no
other claim has been made. 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1599 n. 3 quotes with approval
from Rudstrom v. Sheridan, 122 Minn. 262, 265, 142 N. W. 313, 314, 31 Am.
B. RL 862, 865 (1913): "We assume... that Congress inteded the language of
the statute to be understood in its ordinary signification.... The mere fact that
the liability arose in consequence of his fraud is not alone sufficient; the fraud
must be followed and result in a loss of property to the creditor." See also
Tyler v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 195 Okla. 523, 159 P. 2d 722 (1945)
(must show all elements of actionable fraud including suffering of injury).
20. Cunningham v. Elco Distributors, Inc., 189 F. 2d 87 (6th Cir.
1951) (creditor successfully prosecuted this ground of objection upon a false
written financial statement in which he participated and connived to obtain
credit by bankrupt from a bank which did not object).
21. § 14c(7) Proviso. See 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1292; Nadler, Bank-
ruptcy § 76a.
22. 7 Remington § 3339.50; see Nadler, Bankruptcy § 755.
23. One text writer upon bankruptcy as early as 1917, Brandenburg on
Bankruptcy (1917 ed.), in discussing this feature of the law said: "§ 1495.-
Obtaining property on credit. . . The provision certainly does not apply,
without limit of time, to any obtaining of credit, however long before bank-
ruptcy, and irrespective of intervening transactions with that creditor." The
author then, by analogy to other provisions of the Act says that it is evident
that Congress intended it not to apply to statements prior to four months.
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a year prior to bankruptcy, had in good faith paid the whole note
within the time fixed in the renewal, has committed an act which
may be a valid objection to a discharge of all the provable debts
he owes at bankruptcy, none of which were contracted by fraud.
If, instead, he had embezzled trust funds of a million dollars, no
ground of objection would exist and only the liability would be ex-
cepted. He suffers this "stem penalty and forfeiture," as the courts
have sometimes called it, for nothing more vicious than having
given a statement in writing which was "false to a creditor whom
he paid in full one year ago in accordance with the terms of his
contract." The heights of absurdity appear to have been reached.
Conceding that it is court interpretation of Section 14c(3)
which got us into this mess, the logic of the situation calls for elimin-
ation of that clause leaving Section 17(2) to be invoked, as it was
intended to be, by the creditors who were defrauded.
The existence of Section 14c(3) presents an opportunity for
abusing the processes of the court in obtaining settlements of lia-
bilities alleged to be for money or property obtained by a written
false financial statement even though these liabilities are also ex-
cepted from a discharge by Section 17(2).
The Administrative Office maintains no record of the nature of
the grounds of objections to discharge filed in strict bankruptcy
cases nor to confirmation of Plans of Adjustment.2 4 Referees are
not required to keep such statistics and their decisions are not pub-
lished. The decisions of the district judges upon the subject upon
review furnish no adequate basis for sound conclusions. We have
only the estimates of referees as recently obtained.
Reports from referees in all metropolitan districts, indicate that
perhaps 90% of all objections to discharge filed in the past few years
were based upon Section 14c(3) and, of these the majority, by far,
was a false written financial statement made by individuals not in
business, in obtaining loans from small loan companies and in a
few instances from industrial banks. The loans are small, usually
less than $300, because in most states licensed small loan companies
are limited to loans of $300 or less but permitted to charge 22 to
3% interest on monthly balances. Recently the loan limit has
been increased in several states.
When a debtor has given the lender a false financial statement
in writing, the creditor has a liability excepted under Section 17,
but he also has a claim which supplies the basis of an objection to a
discharge. Since the creditor's debt is, on its face, excepted from a
24. See note 3 supra.
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discharge, he may quite properly take steps to collect his debt re-
gardless of the bankruptcy. In that respect he is as free to act as
a tax authority or a claimant for alimony whose claims are also
excepted liabilities.
To be quite realistic, when such a creditor meets a bankrupt
or debtor and his attorney during the bankruptcy proceedings,
usually at the first meeting during his examination, and elicits in-
formation showing that the statement is false or at least inaccurate,
what is the natural result? The creditor may not say outright: you
know, of course, this gives me ground to object to your discharge,
but the bankrupt's lawyer will know what the lender is after: pay-
ment. There will be no spoken threat; the creditor may demean
himself quite honorably but everybody knows that the threat is
implicit in the situation. What happens then, quite frequently, is
that the bankrupt settles with the creditor, and why not? The
liability is in any event excepted from a discharge and the balance
due on the loan is usually small compared to his total liabilities. It
would be foolish for the bankrupt or debtor not to pay for he knows
that he must pay eventually because this liability will not be dis-
charged. And he will know, or his lawyer will tell him, that if
objection to his discharge or confirmation of his Plan of Adjustment
is filed, he will be back where he started: owing all his debts. Even
if he could successfully meet the objection, it may well cost him more
in money and time than the amount of this particular debt.
Sometimes, especially when the bankrupt's or debtor's lawyer
is ignorant of the law, the creditor does file objections to the dis-
charge (or confirmation of a Plan) and only then does the bank-
rupt's (or debtor's) lawyer awaken to his client's predicament. He
then, without any express inducement or promise from the creditor,
pays the amount due the lender. The lender - still having made no
promises - then files application for leave to withdraw the objec-
tions. Although all creditors are notified of a hearing upon this ap-
plication for leave to withdraw, it is a rare case indeed when any
creditor or trustee objects to the granting of the application. They
realize that they will need the lending creditor's own witnesses to
prove the inaccurate statement to be false; that it was made with
intent to deceive, that the statement was material, and that the
creditor really relied upon it and was deceived. Any court which has
heard and decided these questions when this ground of objection is
presented will understand how difficult it is for any third person to
win this kind of law suit when the creditor himself has been paid or
secured and is no longer interested in preventing a discharge; his
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interest, if any, now is in having the bankrupt discharged from his
other debts. For that reason, no doubt, we find few instances of
objection to an application for leave to withdraw.
The available decisions show that the trustee, in these circum-
stances, seldom deems it advisable to object under Section 47a(9).
It should be said that occasionally the bankrupt is really desirous
of paying a loan company because it helped him in his need. But
this will not prevent some other creditor from objecting to the dis-
charge because of the false statement. And there are perhaps even
more instances where the borrower has deliberately lied in order
to get the money to buy a car or television set. It would be a mis-
take to infer from what is said in support of our contention that
there is any intention to cast the loan company always as Beelzebub
and the borrower always as an angel of light - far from it.
It must be emphasized that no actual misconduct is necessarily
involved in producing the results stated above; it is inherent in the
situation presented when a creditor who is excepted from a dis-
charge or confirmation of a plan may also object to it. It might be
suggested that the court (usually the referee) could do something
about it. What? He could not initiate the objection because he is
the court required to decide the issue.25 As such he could hardly
compel the creditor or the trustee to file an objection, or, if filed,
compel either to proceed with it. If leave to withdraw should be
denied, and the trustee or some other creditor did not care to pro-
ceed, it would be difficult for the referee to do anything. Of course,
he could request that the matter be examined by the district attor-
ney who, if satisfied that a ground for denial of a discharge exists
and that the public interest so warrants, could oppose the dis-
charge.26 He, too, would encounter the hindrance to success above
noted. If, however, there were grounds for believing that there bad
been some agreement or understanding that the creditor should
forbear from objecting to the discharge, a crime may have been com-
mitted, and the referee or the trustee could, and of course should,
certify the facts to the district attorney as provided in U.S. Code
Title 28, Section 191. This was done with some success in at least
two states.2"
That the small loan companies are aware of the opportunity for
25. 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 1269 n. 10; In re Walsh, 256 Fed. 653, 43 Am.
B. R. 266 (7th Cir. 1919). Prior to 1938 only the judge could consider dis-
charges. Referees were frequently appointed Special Masters to consider
them.
26. § 14(c), (d).
27. In Minnesota and Illinois. See 7 Consumer Finance Bulletin (3) 24.
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abuse and misuse of the processes of the court and the explosive
danger inherent in the overlapping of Sections 14c and 17(2) is
frankly disclosed and deplored in their official publications. In them
will be found convincing corroboration of what has been stated here.
In the "Bankruptcy Handbook," recently published by The Na-
tional Consumers Finance Association, and in their earlier "Operat-
ing Instructions for Bankruptcy" 28 will be found repeated un-
equivocal statements of the danger and threat presented in the
administration of the discharge feature of the Bankruptcy Act by
reason of the state of the law. In these publications and others mem-
bers of the association have been warned to avoid the misuse and
abuse so readily encouraged by reason of the fact that loan com-
panies' claims, which are frequently excepted from discharge, at the
same time constitute a ground of objection to a discharge. Over and
over, with notable candor the dangers and pitfalls and methods of
avoiding them are pointed out. Quotations from the Handbook-
which of course are selective-will illustrate the misgivings.
29
28. "Bankruptcy Handbook for Consumer Finance Company Attorneys"
(1954). "Operating Instructions for Bankruptcy" (1950).
29. The following quotations are from the Bankruptcy Handbook. (The
emphasis is by the writer of the book.)
p. 37. "The penalty of denial of discharge as to all debts for having in-
duced a loan by a false financial statement given to only one creditor is a harsh
penalty. p. 37. "The situation is difficult for all parties-the referee, the bank-
rupt, the consumer finance company. Some but not all of the heat and danger
will be dissipated by the growing tendency of such finance companies to recog-
nize the harshness of the penalty of complete denial of discharge and to
referee reluctance to impose it and to rely for relief on state courts under
Sec. 17(2) which automatically excepts from a general order of discharge
those liabilities-which are for obtaining money or property by false pre-
tenses or representations."
p. 41. "The harshness of the penalty under Sec. 14c(3) of complete denial
of discharge has led to efforts to secure split or limited discbarges."
p. 43. "The possibility of violating Title 18 U. S. C. Sec. 152 is present
in every bankruptcy case, but it is generally intensified whenever there is ap-
parent ground for objection to discharge because a false financial statement
in writing may have induced the loan ... the threat of action or non-action
can not be used directly or indirectly to induce such new contract."
p. 45. "Creditors or employees should not contact the bankrupt in person
or otherwise. It too easily affords the bankrupt the opportunity to assert that
the creditor threatened, coerced or bribed him to make a new agreement to
pay the scheduled debt as consideration for not opposing bankrupt's dis-
charge."
p. 46. "If a bankrupt voluntarily offers to pay a scheduled debt or give
a new note therefor, the creditor may accept such payment, or new note."
p. 47. "The manager must avoid any appearance of bringing pressure on
the bankrupt on account of any possible objection to discharge on ground of
false statement or otherwise .... Nothing should be said or permitted to be
said about any financial statement, possible non-dischargeability of a debt or
possible objection to discharge." p. 47. "Examinations of the bankrupt . . .
should be brief... and never inade for the purpose of exerting pressure for a
settlement of companies' claims. Some referees assert that extended examina-
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From the poll of referees,30 it is clear that they are, like the loan
companies, deeply concerned; they are apprehensive and disturbed
about the situation we have described. Some of their comments will
be found in the note below.31 Nearly all the referees in the large
tions by attorneys for creditors with respect to financial statements, in them-
selves, constitute improper pressure. ..."
p. 48. ".... the creditor is in a difficult position...
p. 49. "If, while objections are actually pending, the bankrupt should
offer to settle a creditor's claim the creditor appears to be in a particularly
difficult position.... To the extent that the bankrupt expects consideration
from the creditor, the creditor is in a dangerous position.... It seems almost
needless to add that the express reasons for settlement, however, must be
genuine and not a mere cloak to hide a violation of the Statute......
30. Estimates by referees of the percentage of the total number of all
objections, which were filed by loan companies based on 14c(3), varied. In
metropolitan areas, it usually ran from 80 to 100%; in one of the largest
cities in the country, 19 out of a total of 20; in a middle-west industrial
area, 42 out of 47.
31. A referee in a large western city: "The filing of objections by small
loan companies in this District has almost developed into a racket. They
are about the only persons to take advantage of the Section. It has been inti-
mated that some small loan companies encourage the filing of false state-
ments by the debtor when the debt is renewed because they then can hold a
club over the debtor in case of bankruptcy...."
A referee in a city of 200,000: "The existing provision denies relief to
many who are most in need of it; it is a fertile ground for perjury and bad
business ethics . . . we need reasonable provisions to restrict some of these
companies which have succeeded in largely destroying the benefits of the Act."
A referee whose jurisdiction includes one large city: "The loan com-
panies of (this state) have been educated to the fact that they can accom-
plish more by bringing suit under Sec. 17(2). This is probably the result of a
talk which I gave to their association...."
A referee who passed on 25 objections last year said: "My feeling is that
small loan companies have a potent weapon under Sec. 14c(3) .... (They)
can easily encourage borrowers to present a favorable statement, knowing
a false statement will bar their discharge."
A referee from the west: "The bankrupts consistently maintain that the
person interviewing them at the loan company office instructs them to put
down a 'few' of their present obligations."
Strong words from a referee in the south: "I am opposed to any plan
which would leave a loan company with a non-dischargeable debt."
A referee in an eastern state, where 18 or 20 objections were filed by
loan companies, based upon § 14c(3): "'The best financial statement is a
false statement' seems to be a new maxim engendered by Sec. 14c(3). How
naive can tre become?"
A referee with a fairly large territory who passed on 47 objections to
discharge in a year, of which 42 were by loan companies based on § 14c(3) :
"Small loan companies have made a farce out of financial statements. In most
instances (they) are no evidence of the honesty or dishonesty of the bankrupt
involved. It should be sufficient ... that a non-dischargeable debt is pro-
vided under Sec. 17(2) of the Act."
A referee from a large territory says that, after hearing complaints about
the practice of loan companies, he referred some cases to the U. S. District
Attorney who succeeded in indicting and prosecuting them successfully-ever
since, they have not filed objections in his court.
A referee in a large city in the west: "Even now, after filing objections
they frequently try to settle and do settle with the bankrupt. I have checked
these settlements as carefully as possible but am seriously considering adopting
the practice of denying the withdrawal of such objections.... As you know,
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cities have felt uneasy, badgered with doubt, in performing their
duty to follow the law in passing upon objections to discharges
where this ground of objection is presented and the bankrupt is a
wage earner or on salary. They have felt that the Bankruptcy Act
was falling short in relieving from debt the person who most needed
it- a debtor, burdened with debt, who ought to be enabled by a
discharge, again to take his place in society, to earn a living, sup-
port his family, and perform his duties as a citizen. Almost unani-
mously, these referees are convinced that it would be in the interest
of untainted administration, in the interest of debtors and creditors
alike and in the general interest, that clause 3 of Section 14c be
eliminated or, at the least, modified to permit the class of debtors
not in business who have given false written financial statements to
obtain credit to be discharged, always saving however, the non-
dischargeability of the specified liability.
The ominous condition herein described has not gone un-
noticed in other quarters . 2 A perceptive district judge felt called
upon to speak of it when such a case came before him.33
The officials of the loan companies, although they decry the
abuse of a privilege available, are critical but less analytical. They
hesitate to prescribe extirpation of the source of infection but sug-
gest application of poultices of caution. It would seem that they
should rest content in having a noln-dischargeable debt.
there's danger of the loan company browbeating the bankrupt under these
circumstances."
A referee in a city of a million inhabitants: "I can recall no case in the
past years where loan companies have successfully prosecuted their objec-
tions under Sec. 14c(3)."
A referee who passed on 18 discharges: "I am loath to deny discharges on
the ground of false financial statement to a loan company."
And see Referee H. S. Snyder: "Small Loan Company and the Bank-
ruptcy Act," Quarterly Report (Fall of 1953) p. 120.
32. See Note, Effect of Discharge in Bankruptcy: Jurisdictional Prob-
lcms, 1S Brooklyn L. Rev. 271 (1952).
33. "What I have set down to this point disposes of the matter before the
court. But because I believe it might be of use and complete the whole pic-
ture I will now discuss the implication which is clear from the foregoing
findings-that is, that the agents of the objecting creditors deliberately con-
trived to obtain a financial statement that would be incomplete and erroneous
for the purpose of using it to prevent the extinguishment of their claim by a
discharge in bankruptcy ... There was a type of reliance in this case, of
course-but not on the financial statements as claimed. It is my conclusion
from all of the evidence that the agents of the objecting creditors knew that
Anderson was a sober, industrious workingman who had worked steadily
for one employer for over twenty years; they knew, too, that he had shown
no disposition to rebellion but had plodded along paying and refinancing,
and also, they knew they had financial statements which were incomplete and
erroneous which would be useful to them in the event he would attempt to
obtain relief in the bankruptcy court. These-not the financial statements-
were the things upon which the objecting creditors relied." Judge Tehan in
it re Anderson, 104 F. Supp. 599, 605-606 (E.D. Wis. 1952).
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The Intent of Congress
Congress did not, in enacting Section 14c(3) in 1903, have in
mind making a liability for obtaining credit by written false finan-
cial statements by a person not engaged in business a ground of
objection to a discharge in addition to excepting such liability from
a discharge. Nor do any of the amendments disclose such intention.
We must keep in mind that from the earliest days of our country
there were fears lest the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution be
held to include and apply to others than merchants and traders.3 '
The early Bankruptcy Laws in this country provided relief only
for the latter two235 In the Act of 1867, which preceded the present
Act of 1898, relief was generally extended but a discharge was de-
nied "if being a merchant or tradesman he has not kept proper
books of account."
It was in this prevailing economic atmosphere that the amend-
ment in 1903 of Section 14c(3) was passed. It was directed to the
then common financial statements by business men, setting forth
their assets and liabilities and the net worth, the kind of statement
given by them to mercantile agencies like Dun or Bradstreet. This
seems to be amply illustrated by the reports of the Congressional
Committees and the debates in Congress - even those relating to
the amendments of the clause in 1910 and 1926.
With respect to the original enactment in 1903, Collier in his
sixth edition, published in 1907, as well as in later editions recog-
nized it as a tradesman's mercantile statement.86 Collier, beginning
in 1907, and included in his fourteenth edition, quotes a Congres-
sional Report made at the time of its enactment in 1903.87
34. See Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 7 (1935).
35. In the Act of 1800, relief was limited to ". . . any merchant or
other person using the trade of merchandise, by buying and selling in gross,
or by retail, or dealing in exchange, or as a banker, broker, factor, under-
writer or marine insurer." 1 Stat. 20 (1800).
The Act of 1841 provided general relief but restricted discharges by pro-
viding: ". . . nor shall any person being a merchant, banker, factor, broker,
underwriter, or marine insurer be entitled to any such discharge . . . who
shall not have kept books of account. .. ." 5 Stat 444 (1841).
36. Collier, Bankruptcy 197 (6th ed. 1907) : "The effect of this new
objection (§ 14b(3)) will be that every tradesman, whose credit is not unques-
tioned, will be asked to give a mercantile statement as a condition precedent
to dealing, and, it may be suggested, a new statement with every new trans-
action."
On page 198 of the 6th edition and down to and including the 13th edition
of Collier, Bankruptcy: "Details are unnecessary, but the statement ought
at least to inform, the creditor of the net worth of the debtor, or perhaps of
the total of his assets and liabilities. In a majority of these cases, these state-
ments will be made on blanks calling for items, and so phrased as to avoid
some of the legal pitfalls noted later."
37. 1 Collier, Bankruptcy 389 (12th ed. 1921) and 1 Collier (13th ed.
1923). In 1 Collier 1364, n. 1 (14th ed.), the text of the 12th and 13th editions
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In amending this clause in 1910, the report of the judiciary
Committee of the House used this language:
"Section 6: The bill makes three changes in Subdivision b
of Section 14 of the present Act... Third that a false mer-
cantile statement, if nmade to the trade and relied on by the
creditors, shall be an available objection to the debtor's dis-
charge ... "
"The change accomplished by the Bill is simply one which
makes available to any creditor any materially false mercantile
statement on which the debtor has obtained money or property
on credit, and irrespective of whether such statement has been
given to the creditor objecting or communicated generally to
the trade.38
In the debate in the House upon this amendment, it appears
that the members were discussing mercantile statements. The argu-
ments for and against it clearly evidence that fact as appears from
the note below.39
The 1910 Report of the Judiciary Committee of the Senate also
clearly indicates that the proposed amendment applied to mercantile
statements of businessmen made to the trade. In part it reads:
".... Third, that a materiallly false mercantile statement,
is repeated but as part of the opinion of a court which adopted it: In re
Cazer, 283 Fed. 852, 853, 49 Am. B. R. 289, 290-291 (N.D. Iowa 1922). It
reads:
"In writing ... of this term (§ 14b(3)) the framers of the Amendatory
Act of 1903 have said 'This objection, as is proper, will be of no avail when
a commercial report is obtained in the haphazard fashion of a hasty interview.
The statement must be in writing, which, of course, implies the signature of
the person to be charged thereby.'"
As appears from note 9 supra, Collier in his 14th edition as well as in his
13th edition, declares the rule which is that of the courts generally. 1 Collier
1358 (14th ed.) : "Since there is nothing in the words of § 14c(3) nor in the
history of its adoption, confining its application to merchants, it applies to
all who ask a discharge in bankruptcy." Only one case is cited: In re Day,
268 Fed. 871 (N.D. Ga. 1920). The Collier statement is taken practically
verbatim from the opinion. There was no discussion of the question of limita-
tion to merchants, and it is only by inference that it appears that the bankrupt
in that case was not a merchant.
38. H. R. Rep. No. 511, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1910).
39. Congressman Clayton arguing against the amendment declared
that "the business of commercial agencies will be benefited by this legislative
endorsement of their methods, and by this additional force given to the reports
or statements which they gather from time to time. But it will not be said
that giving an impetus or encouragement to the private business of coln-
ncrcial agencies can be of real public benefit." 45 Cong. Rec. 2271 (1910).
Congressman Sherley, arguing in favor of the amendment, said: "If that
statement is made for the purpose of being communicated to the trade, can
the man who knowingly makes a false statement in writing to get a credit
complain? . . .This can affect only the dishonest man, only the man who is
trying to get something by holding out a false representation to the coun-
try. . . ." Id. at 2275.
Later Sherley in explaining the amendment of which he was the author,
stated as "making the giving of a false mercantile statement in writing as a
basis of credit an objection to discharge." Id. at 2277.
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if made to the trade and relied on by the creditor, shall be an
available objection to the debtor's discharge.40
The Report continues to say that it:
"in effect would make the obtaining of property on false
written statements to mercantile agencies ground of objection
to discharge, without the creditor ... first asking such mnarcan-
tile agency to procure him the written statement.... Merchants
are likely to make careless general statements where they would
be very careful were they making statements to creditors from
whom they were at the time asking credit."41
Several reported cases decided shortly after this ground was
enacted, bear out the contention that the 1910 amendment as well
as the original clause in 1903, related to financial statements by
merchants.
42
When, in 1926, this clause was further amended, it was again
for the purpose of making ce:tain that financial statements to com-
mercial agencies such as R. G. Dun or Bradstreet were included as
well as those made directly to the creditor. In commenting on the
proposed amendment, the judiciary Committee of the House said:
40. Sen. Rep. No. 691, 61st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1910).
41. Ibid.
42. In re Morgan, 267 Fed. 959, 963, 45 Am. B. R. 612, 618 (2d Cir.
1920): "The Bankruptcy Act lirmited the cases where so severe a penalty is
inflicted as a refusal to grant a cEscharge from the bankrupt's provable debts
upon the objection of a creditor to moneys or property obtained on false state-
ments made for the purpose of obtaining credit. It is intended that acts done
prior to the bankruptcy proceedings, which amount to a fraud on the system
of commercial credit, shall be regulated by the Bankruptcy Law. .. ."
In re Hudson, 262 Fed. 778, 778-779, 45 Am. B. R. 275, 276-277 (S.D.
Ala. 1920). Bankrupt obtained a loan from creditor; gave notes and mortgage
on automobile. Discharge was granted. The court, stating that the facts do
literally come within the provision of subsection 3 stated, "The question,
however, is whether this was such an obtaining of money on credit as was
contemplated by Congress when this provision was written .... The Bank-
ruptcy Act was primarily written to cover ordinary mercantile dealings; so
the words in the Act are to be given the construction and meaning ordinarily
understood in mercantile dealings, and not the strict technical construction
which they may be susceptible of. . . .The fact that Congress used these
words to denote the ordinary credit dealings between merchant and customer
is indicated by the construction placed upon this subdivision by all the
text writers, such as Collier, Bardenberg, and Remington. In discussing this
provision, they all treat it as a provision intended by Congress to deny a dis-
charge where the money or goods were secured on some representation by the
borrower, such as the statements ordinarily given to mercantile agencles-a
statement of facts made as a basis of credit between a customer and a mer-
chant .. ."
"The fact that these writers have all so construed this provision, and
have not conceived that it went far enough to include money or property
obtained by false pretenses or false representations, is persuasive evidence
that the language used by Congress was not intended to include such a state
of facts, and is supported by the further fact that Congress wrote into the
Bankruptcy Act, in Section 17, the following: (The court here quotes § 17
which excepts from a discharge liabilities for obtaining property by false pre-
tenses or false representations)."
And see In re Robinson, 266 Fed. 970, 45 Am. B. R. 619 (1st Cir. 1920).
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".... The commerce of to-day is transacted almost entirely
upon credit. Under the present law a false financial statement
to be grounds for denying a discharge must be given directly to
the complaining creditor or his representative. The amendatory
provision serves to prevent those evasions of the law which now
occur by having the false statements made to and distributed by
commercial agencies."43
It would appear from the foregoing that Congress had in mind
no more than the financial statements ordinarily furnished by per-
sons in business: mercantile statements such as those given to Dun
or Bradstreet - a statement of assets and liabilities and net worth.
This conclusion seems to be warranted not only by the statements
of the Congressional Committees, the debates, and the text writers
of that day, but also by the state of our economy and our commerce
of that day.
Need For a Change
Whether or not Congress, in 1903 when the original Section
14b(3) was enacted and later when the amendments thereto were
passed, intended to include in that clause any written statement
respecting the financial condition of the debtor, whether made by a
business man or other person, the radical changes in our economic
and social life, call for elimination of that clause if the purposes of
a Bankruptcy Act are to be achieved.
Surely, no one will deny that our economy, our business prac-
tices and our credit system in 1955 bears little resemblance to that
prevalent in 1903. In the past 52 years "there have been some
changes made." These changes have occurred not only in science,
ushering in the atomic age, but in business and industry, our pro-
duction methods and in particular our credit practices which bear
intimate relation to bankruptcy.
As already said, the vast majority of objections to discharge of
individuals in bankruptcy filed in recent years were based upon
Section 14c(3) and were filed by small loan companies. In 1903
there were no licensed small loan companies. Today they are 8000
offices in 37 states which are lending close to 2 billion dollars a year
to some 10 million people. 4  In 1903 few wage earners went into
43. H. R. Rep. No. 695, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1926).
44. The president of the National Consumers Finance Association, John
L. Mentz, recently said: "Last year America's 8000 licensed Consumer
Finance offices loaned $2,825,000,000 to some 10,000,000 people or one out of
every five families in the 37 states where we operate under some variant of
the Uniform Small Loan Law. This year it is estimated that $3,000,000,000.00
will be poured into the economic blood stream of America by the licensed
Consumer Finance offices." Personal Financier, Nov.-Dec., 1954.
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bankruptcy. Today there are thousands. What has happened in this
particular is fully and interestingly told in two publications issued
in 1941 and in 1954.45
It all started in 1907 with a study of the Loan Shark problem
by the Russell Sage Foundation. Prior to that time, except for
businessmen who borrowed from banks at the legal rate of interest,
the individual borrower was the prey of the loan shark. Limited by
the usury statutes neither the banks nor anyone else could profitably
lend small sums. It was because of the emergence in our economy
of the licensed small loan company that, for the first time in our
history, there became available to wage earners and clerical workers
the opportunity to borrow small sums at reasonable rates, although
the rates permitted by the state were above those allowed by the
regular usury statutes.
While a few states authorized the organization of small loan
companies prior to 1930, most of the 39 states presently providing
for their operation did not pass effective "small loan laws" until
the 1930's - several years after the last amendment to Section
14b(3). By those laws, those states made a distinction in their
usury statutes between business transactions and the small loan
needs of the small man. The licensed small loan companies satisfied
this insistent need. This need was one of the concomitants of the
industrial revolution which, after World War I, proceeded with
accelerating tempo. Mechanization, industrialization, and urbani-
zation transformed the structure of our society. It raised to the
proportions of a major problem the protection for the needy bor-
rower against his own ignorance and the pressure of his needs
and his demands.
The great mass of borrowers then came to be not business men
but consumers; people dependent upon wages which might cease at
any moment. These people -were of a different character from those
who borrowed from banks in 1903 for commercial purposes since
the 1903 borrowers were sufficiently strong economically to avoid
being seriously imposed upon. When in 1955 the small borrower
defaults for any reason, his wages are often garnished, and as a
.result he may lose his job and be left in a precarious economic
position.
In recent years this class of borrowers and the number of small
45. The Loan Shark Probi'em Today, 19 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1
(1954); Combating the Loan Shark, 8 Law & Contemp. Prob. 1 (1941). A
brief resum6 of the 1954 articles is found in The Reporter, April 13, 1954, p. 23.
Further informative material will be found in Quarterly Report, published
by the Conference on Law of the National Association.
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loan companies have increased as our country has, more and more,
gone into mass production. And the small loan borrower has be-
come the mass consumer. It is no exaggeration to say that, today,
consumer credit as much as wholesale business credit, bears a di-
rect relationship to the magnitude of the purchase and sale of the
vast amount of consumer goods available, and the employment of
large numbers in industry. Without" this credit it would be impos-
sible to create an adequate market to sustain more and more pro-
duction as well as lower costs and prices within the average family
budget.
More could be said of this comparatively new phenomenon in
our economy and its revolutionary results as measured by the con-
ditions obtaining in 1903 -even in 1926. But enough has been
said to show that in these earlier times "obtaining credit by false
representations" did not mean, realistically, what it does today
when applied to the millions of persons who make statements every
day and obtain credit from small loan companies for purposes other
than business. 46 _
What can be said for retention of this clause in Section 14c
when a wage earner having no physical assets and with only his
wages to support himself and his family, wishes to pay his debts in
full or in part over a period of three years by proposing a Wage
Earner Plan under Chap. XIII? Although all of his creditors, ex-
cept a loan company with a false financial statement agree to the
plan, this creditor can prevent confirmation of the Plan.
It is nothing new to say that bankruptcy laws should be amended
in accord with changing economic conditions to fulfill the purpose
of relieving the overburden deserving debtor.4 7 It is time for the
Bankruptcy Act to catch up with the times.
ARGUMENT IN FAVOR OF MODIFICATION ONLY
Several referees, while fully agreeing that 14c(3) is vulnerable
for the reasons herein advanced for elimination, prefer that it be
46. justice Wrn. 0. Douglas after a survey of bankruptcy administration
in speaking of discharges: Aspects of Bankruptcy, 41 Yale L. J. 329, 349
(1932): "In devising an administrative procedure to handle such cases of
conumers there are additional factors to be considered. The prevalence of
high-pressure salesmanship with seductive means for breaking down sales re-
sistance has not been accompanied by the correlative technique among buyers
of building up sales resistance. Subtle methods of advertising, the advent of in-
stallment buying, the growth and development of financial agencies for
financing the consumer, all have made the temptation to extravagance over-
whelming."
47. See Warren, Bankruptcy in United States History 8 (1935) ; see
Continental Ill. Nat. Bank & Trust Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry., 294
U. S. 648, 671 (1935).
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modified to apply only to false written financial statements made by
businessmen in obtaining credit. In effect they would, by appropriate
amendment, restore 14c(3) to what we have contended was its
original purpose and meaning .by Congress when it was originally
enacted. There is merit in this position.
It can be argued that a businessman who makes a written false
financial statement of his assets and liabilities to be published to the
world by way of a mercantile agency, has committed an act so im-
plicit with moral obloquy and with such complete disregard of
commercial ethics, that mere exception of liabilities incurred to
creditors who relied upon the statement, is not "a sufficient penalty"-
more accurately, is not good public policy. Further, it can with con-
siderable force be urged that, unlike the wage earner and clerical
worker who borrows money on a financial statement, a businessman
is not a mere consumer; presumably he has the experience and the
ability to bargain fairly and is not so readily imposed upon or be-
guiled by expert salesmen. Moreover if the discharge be denied or
his Plan of Adjustment be denied confirmation, he would not, ordi-
narily, be so helpless to readjust himself as the wage earner who
will be left without means of support for himself and family if his
wages are garnished.
But would it not be sufficient to leave every defrauded creditor
free of the defense of discharge or unaffected by a confirmed Plan of
Adjustment? In the case of an Arrangement the bankrupt, a busi-
nessman, could have his Arrangement confirmed in spite of the
existence of one or more defrauded creditors. He would, having
fully compromised all of his other debts (including the payment
of the same percentage to the defrauded creditor) be in position to
pay the defrauded creditors in full. If the Confirmation is denied
he would still be burdened with all his debts and lack the induce-
ment to pay any of them.
There is at least a partial answer to the above statement. In the
case of the individual not in business, there are rarely more than one.
or possibly two creditors who have a debt obtained by a false state-
ment. In the case of businessmen, there are more likely to be many,
particularly if the financial statement had been given to some na-
tional commercial agency. In such instance creditors in different
parts of the country might have relied upon it. In order to realize
upon their claims excepted as they would be under Section 17(2),
it would place considerable burden upon a large number of creditors
to prove fraudulent representation in obtaining credit. So it could
be said that such an extensive and reckless broadcasting of a false
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statement to obtain credit wholesale, requires a denial of a dis-
charge, if not as punishment, at least in the interest of promoting
honesty in commerce and in the general interest of the public. 48
Some difficulty has been encountered by those who would
modify Section 14c(3) in the respect stated. It should not be too
difficult. Our early bankruptcy laws were limited in their relief to
merchants and traders as we have seen.49
It would seem that all that would be required is to amend the
clause by providing in substance, for example: "Sec. 14c(3) : while
engaged in business obtained money or property on credit...."
However, if amendment is to be limited to restricting the effect
of clause (3) to persons in business, it should also be further
amended to remove some of the extravagant gloss of construction
with which the courts have adorned it. One absurdity should be
corrected : the holding that although at bankruptcy no present creditor
had extended credit upon a false written statement, any creditor
or the trustee may invoke this clause upon the ground that a person
who had been a creditor extended credit upon a statement allegedly
fraudulent even though he was in fact and law not defrauded be-
cause he had been paid. °
This could probably be accomplished by adding three additional
words to the proposed clause, e.g.,
"(3) while engaged in business obtained from a creditor money,
or property on credit.... ."I"
CONCLUSION
Whether eliminated or modified, the present situation as it
affects the administration of the Act relating to discharges, is in-
tolerable. The time has come for a re-examination of Section 14c(3)
and its amendment to eliminate the evil that it has spawned. There
appears to be no other hope for a peaceful co-existence with it and
its ally, Section 17, as those sections now stand.
48. There is also the procedural advantage to the objector under §
14c (7) Proviso.
49. See note 36 supra.
50. See notes 19 and 20 mepra.
51. See definition of word "creditor." § 1 (11) of the Act.

